Agnes
[[Enders 10, 60 Nr. 2189 bringt ein von Luther ausgestelltes “Empfehlungsschreiben für einen Äthiopier, Namens Michael” mit dem Datum: Wittenberg 4. Juli 1534. Enders hat “mit den meisten Handschriften” als Datum 4. Non. Iul., nicht, wie andere Hss. haben, Non. Iul. (was der 7. Juli wäre) angenommen. Jndes sind die Hss. nicht vollständig verzeichnet, und dann waren sie nicht zu zählen, sondern zu werten. Man möchte das eine wie das andere Datum bezweifeln, da Melanchthon am 31. Mai an Benedict Pauli (CR. 2, 730) von einem umherreisenden Araber, der aber aller Wahrscheinlichkeit nach mit unserm Äthiopier Michael identisch ist, schreibt: ‘Hospes est Valentin Ebrart’ = er wohnt im Gasthof des Valentin Eberhart (Nik. Müller, Die Wittenberger Bewegung 1521 und 1522, S. 94) — bis 4. bzw. 7. Juli wird er kaum da logiert haben — und: ‘Cras audio iterum abiturum esse’; Melanchthon schreibt diesen Brief, den der Araber am folgenden Tage mitnehmen soll. Dem Briefe Melanchthons entnehme ich noch folgendes: ‘Locutus est pauca cum Luthero per interpretem, qui scit italice, qui est scholasticus noster. Is ait eum valde corrupte Italicum loqui ... Latine parum admodum scit. Tantum de Trinitate dixit Luthero sententiam orientalis ecclesiae convenientem cum occidentali ecclesia. Nec possumus satis colloqui, cum nullam occidentalem linguam satis calleat, nec latinam nec italicam nec graecam. Interrogavi, an sciret graece scribere; negat se
[Seite 86]
[Band 7.]
nosse characteres graecos, sed vulgare graecum scire credo, sicut italicum scit ...’ Sehr wahrscheinlich beziehen sich auf unsern Äthiopier auch die Tischreden U. A. 4, Nr. 4126 (Lauterbach 17. November 1538): ‘Ante triennium nobiscum hic erat monachus Aethiops, cum quo disputabamus per interpretem, et iste omnibus nostris articulis conclusus dicebat: Ista est bona creda, id est fides.’ Und 5, Nr. 6035: ‘Respondit Philippus Melanthon Aethiopem quendam ante triennium Witebergae fuisse, qui affirmasset in Asia nullum exemplum privatae missae esse, sed tantum unam publicam missam.’ Jrrig bezieht Kroker die beiden Tischreden auf den “Mohren” Franziskus, dem das Empfehlungsschreiben vom 24. Mai 1538 Enders 11, 367, Nr. 2611 gelte. Dieser Franziskus wird vielmehr identisch sein mit Franz Megara, in welchem Falle das Schreiben vom 20. Mai 1541 zu datieren wäre (Flemming in ThStKr. 1912, S. 558). Wir lassen nun das von Enders, sowie bei Schütze 2, 319, im CR. 2, 737 und bei de Wette 4, 550 gedruckte Empfehlungsschreiben Luthers für den Äthiopier folgen:]]
NOTES: Thanks to Agnes of Luther Index for providing the above their resources.For further on this see #2072 below.
Wednesday, March 28, 2007
Tuesday, March 27, 2007
#2074-To Justus Menius in Eisenach
To th e worthy man Justus Menius,the faithful servant of Christ in the church of Eisenach, his very faithful (friend?) in the LOrd.
Grace and peace in Christ! Finally Hieronymous sends a letter and words of his reliability, as it were, of an unworthy sinner. You, my dear Justus, bring it about that he is justified through the grace and present of the Prince. This messenger is reliable and trustworthy so that you can entrust the gift for safekeeping (depositum) to one whom you know can be trusted. Previously we lacked a messenger in whom we were confident that he could be depended upon. It comes upon you to also proclaim this article of the Gospel to the poor as much as you. It would be insulting for me further to write about your trustworthiness.
We rejoice that the Landgraf (of Wuerttemberg)has returned after the matters are well-disposed of and peace has been obtained. God is revealed as the cause thereof who contrary to our expectations and all our fears has turned into peace.HE who has begun it will bring it to fruition, Amen. Be it well with you and pray for me. On the Tuesday after Margaretha (14 July) 1534. Your Martin Luther.
NOTE: See #'s 2041 and 2050 for the beneficient of the Prince from the priestly income of the Wartburg for Weller to continue his studies at Wittenberg.ML is playing a little on the grace of justification which Justus would well understand.
Grace and peace in Christ! Finally Hieronymous sends a letter and words of his reliability, as it were, of an unworthy sinner. You, my dear Justus, bring it about that he is justified through the grace and present of the Prince. This messenger is reliable and trustworthy so that you can entrust the gift for safekeeping (depositum) to one whom you know can be trusted. Previously we lacked a messenger in whom we were confident that he could be depended upon. It comes upon you to also proclaim this article of the Gospel to the poor as much as you. It would be insulting for me further to write about your trustworthiness.
We rejoice that the Landgraf (of Wuerttemberg)has returned after the matters are well-disposed of and peace has been obtained. God is revealed as the cause thereof who contrary to our expectations and all our fears has turned into peace.HE who has begun it will bring it to fruition, Amen. Be it well with you and pray for me. On the Tuesday after Margaretha (14 July) 1534. Your Martin Luther.
NOTE: See #'s 2041 and 2050 for the beneficient of the Prince from the priestly income of the Wartburg for Weller to continue his studies at Wittenberg.ML is playing a little on the grace of justification which Justus would well understand.
Monday, March 26, 2007
#2072-Inheritance Contract among the Luther sisters and brothers r
Let it be known to everyone to whom this my handwriting appears that before me here in Wittenberg has appeared my dear brother Jakob Luther, citizen of Mansfeld and my dear brother-in-law and cousin, Paul Mackenrot and Georg Kaufmann, and among one another a friendly, stable contract has been entered into and established regarding the property of our dear sainted father,Hans Luther, namely, and in the following manner: that Jacob Luther takes altogether the same property and pays back everyone their portion with our consent, me Doctor Martin, on behalf of Hans Polner, and his brother and sister, and harmoniously consider it as worth 1350 gulden and that each child should receive 350 gulden of the above named property of our dear father. And Jacob Luther should now as of the date of this letter pay 200 gulden and afterward at this time of the year annually pay 200 gulden also until the other inheritors are satisfied and if should be left up to him whether he wants or might now or on any day pay off. We also regard as good that Paul Mackenrot, according to his position and necessity, be the first to receive his portion and afterward Georg Kaufmann also for reason of need. Because then all of us here think such to be good we appeal to our other brother and sister, cousin (male cousin) and cousin (female cousins), would permit the same and be pleased so that disfavor and complaints be taken away which we also herewith have smoothed over and want everything to have died which is not proper for blood-relations, brotherly, friendly,Christian, and loving and supporting one another. Done on the 10th of July 1534. Amen. D. Martinus Luther, by his own hand.
Thursday, March 22, 2007
#2072-Recommendation-writing for an Oriental Ecclesiastic
There is with us in Germany Herr Michael Aethiops (an Ethiopian?, an Arab?), Deacon, whom we have have confidentially conversed with himon Christian doctrine and have heard him and , with the confession of faith (symbolo)of the Occidental Church,he agrees as true and also has no different opinion on the Holy Trinity than that of the Occidental Church. Therfore we commend him to good people as much as we can. Although the Eastern Church has several deviant ceremonies he judges that the dissimilarity does not nullify the unity of the Church and does not strive against the faith because the kingdom of Christ is the spiritual righteousness of the heart, the fear of God and the security through Christ. We think this opinion is right also. We have also learned from that regarding the administration of the Lord's Supper (Abendmahl)and the Mass,as observed by us,we are in agreement with the Eastern Church. We wish however, that all peoples would confess Christ and obey in true trust on His mercy and in love for the neighbor. For this reason we pray that good people demonstrate Christian love also to this guest. Given at Wittenberg on the 7th of July 1534.Martin Luther.
NOTE: Really, not fellowship with the Eastern Orthodox Christians? The Editors think this is the Arab whom Melanchton talked about with Benedict Pauli on 31 May. Question? Is Aethipos a name or meaning an Ethiopian?
NOTE: Really, not fellowship with the Eastern Orthodox Christians? The Editors think this is the Arab whom Melanchton talked about with Benedict Pauli on 31 May. Question? Is Aethipos a name or meaning an Ethiopian?
#2071-To Duke Heinrich V of Mecklenburg
To the illustrious, high-born Prince and Lord, Herr Hinrich, Duke in Mecklenburg etc.,my gracious Lord.
Grace and peace in Christ together with my poor Pater noster. Illustrious, high-born Prince, gracious Lord! E. fuerstl. Gnade (your Princely Grace) has written to me and sent therewith a preacher's confession and I could not keep the same from my most gracious Lord (i.e. the Elector) and his churf. (electoral) G.(grace)who may also write an admonition to E.F.g.(Heinrich V) with all earnestness. There are now so many examples of sectarian spirits coming before us that we should be acutely watchful and spright. The devil cannot and does not want to let up as we have learned from experience apart from and by the Scriptures. Thereon E.F.G. must earnestly proceed well and see that this preacher cease or take his staff somewhere else; since he is of no use and has crickets in the head, previously unheard of or read about, and is absolutely crazy without any basis in the Holy Scripture. Several here think it is Henr. Neverus, who became a Barefoot in Wismar, who here in Wittenberg lost a debate on the five wounds of St. Francis and they for a time had a chapter here. E.F.G. wants to help promote Christ's glory as all of us are responsible to do against the devil's messengers. Herewith, be commended to God, Amen. In Wittenberg,1530 (1534?) on the Tuesday after the Visitation of Mary( 7 July). E.F.G.'s willing Martinus Luther,D.
NOTE: De Wette conjectures this is 1534. ML would have been in Coburg in 1530.
Grace and peace in Christ together with my poor Pater noster. Illustrious, high-born Prince, gracious Lord! E. fuerstl. Gnade (your Princely Grace) has written to me and sent therewith a preacher's confession and I could not keep the same from my most gracious Lord (i.e. the Elector) and his churf. (electoral) G.(grace)who may also write an admonition to E.F.g.(Heinrich V) with all earnestness. There are now so many examples of sectarian spirits coming before us that we should be acutely watchful and spright. The devil cannot and does not want to let up as we have learned from experience apart from and by the Scriptures. Thereon E.F.G. must earnestly proceed well and see that this preacher cease or take his staff somewhere else; since he is of no use and has crickets in the head, previously unheard of or read about, and is absolutely crazy without any basis in the Holy Scripture. Several here think it is Henr. Neverus, who became a Barefoot in Wismar, who here in Wittenberg lost a debate on the five wounds of St. Francis and they for a time had a chapter here. E.F.G. wants to help promote Christ's glory as all of us are responsible to do against the devil's messengers. Herewith, be commended to God, Amen. In Wittenberg,1530 (1534?) on the Tuesday after the Visitation of Mary( 7 July). E.F.G.'s willing Martinus Luther,D.
NOTE: De Wette conjectures this is 1534. ML would have been in Coburg in 1530.
Tuesday, March 20, 2007
Monday, March 19, 2007
#2070-To Friedrich Myconius in Gotha
Grace and peace! My dear Myconius, the matter of this Koersner you sent to me late. Our judge had already made a judgment for this (as you name her) Gela, and she said that she has clear witnesses for the other party otherwise I would have, according to my opinion, made my pronouncement for that other Osanna. What should I do now? I can revoke nothing I must leave it to her judge as a matter that is not under my jurisdiction.
Concerning the Anabaptists in Muenster I am little troubled. Satan rages but the Scriputre stands firm that Christ is the seed of woman, the seed of Abraham, the seed of David, the fruit of the body, the fruit of the loins. These thunder bolts of the Spirit do not permit me to imagine anything other than that Christ is a natural son of the flesh of the virgin unless we do not know what the seed of the woman, of men, or humanity is etc. Therefore do not be so very disturbed about the Greek words themselves. As one says, from that which it is born, it is and it will be as it was born. However, it is added that He is from seeds and from a woman and so was born. In haste and very busy. Pray for me. On the Sunday after the Visitation (Maria)1534. [5 July]. Your Martin Luther.
NOTE: Evidently Myconius raised a question based on Galatians 4:4 where it says:"God sent forth His Son MADE (Gk=genomenon; Latin=factum) of a woman."
Concerning the Anabaptists in Muenster I am little troubled. Satan rages but the Scriputre stands firm that Christ is the seed of woman, the seed of Abraham, the seed of David, the fruit of the body, the fruit of the loins. These thunder bolts of the Spirit do not permit me to imagine anything other than that Christ is a natural son of the flesh of the virgin unless we do not know what the seed of the woman, of men, or humanity is etc. Therefore do not be so very disturbed about the Greek words themselves. As one says, from that which it is born, it is and it will be as it was born. However, it is added that He is from seeds and from a woman and so was born. In haste and very busy. Pray for me. On the Sunday after the Visitation (Maria)1534. [5 July]. Your Martin Luther.
NOTE: Evidently Myconius raised a question based on Galatians 4:4 where it says:"God sent forth His Son MADE (Gk=genomenon; Latin=factum) of a woman."
Sunday, March 18, 2007
Jphann Reuchlin - Great Hebrew Scholar
REUCHLIN, reiH''lin' (CAPNION), JOHANNES: German humanist; b. at Pforzheim (24 m. n.w. of Stuttgart) Feb. 22, 1455; d. at Bad Liebenzell (20 m. w. of Stuttgart) June 30, 1522. After a brief course at the University of Freiburg, where he was matriculated May 19, 1470, he was a chorister in his native town and then gained a place at court in the chantry of the Margrave Charles I. The latter sent him as companion to his son to the University of Paris, where he began the study of Greek. In the summer of 1474 he worked at Basel (B.A., 1475; M.A., 1477), still continuing his study of Greek. At this period he composed his Vocabularius breviloquus (1475), but his teaching of Aristotelian philosophy brought him into conflict with the "sophists" of the university. He accordingly returned to Paris and resumed his Greek studies, then went to Orl�ans in 1478 to study jurisprudence, receiving his degree in law in the following year and supporting himself by teaching. He continued his legal studies at Poitiers and became licentiate of law in 1481. Reuchlin then returned to Germany arid intended to lecture at Tübingen, but was requested by Count Eberhard im Bart to accompany him to Rome. After his return to Germany he was the counselor of the count and also practised law in Stuttgart. In 1484 he received a seat among the court judges, and two years later was Eberhard's envoy to the Diet of Frankfort, besides attending the coronation of Maximilian at Aachen. Meanwhile Reuchlin had begun the study of Hebrew. He visited Rome a second time in 1490 as the companion of the natural son of Eberhard, and two years later the count sent him to the court of the Emperor Frederick at Linz on a diplomatic mission. The emperor honored Reuchlin by conferring on him the title and privileges of a palsgrave, and here he secured instruction in Hebrew from the emperor's physicianin-ordinary, the learned Jew Jacob Loans. He now devoted himself to the mystery of the Cabala (q.v.), and in 1494 his De verbo mirifico appeared, in which he sought to show that God and man meet through the revelation of the mysteries contained in the marvelous names of God, especially in the tetragrammaton, the ineffable first becoming utterable through the most marvelous of all names (which he transliterated Jhovh, Jesus, recalling the tetragrammaton Yhwh), wherein man is united with God and saved.
The death of Eberhard (Feb. 24, 1496) brought Reuchlin in peril of his life from the unbridled Eberhard the Younger and the Augustinian Konrad Holzinger, who were opposed to him. He fled from Stuttgart to Heidelberg and was appointed counselor and chief tutor by the Elector Palatine Philip, Dec. 31, 1497. In 1498 Reuchlin again went to Rome on a mission for his patron, finding opportunity to continue his Hebrew studies with a learned Jew, Obadiah Sforno, and meeting Aldus Manucius at Venice. In Apr., 1499, he was again at home. During the period of his residence at Heidelberg, which was now to end, he had written, besides Latin poems and epigrams, two Latin comedies in imitation of Terence, Sergius, and Henno.
Meanwhile Eberhard the Younger had been deposed in W�rttemberg, and it became possible for Reuchlin to return to Stuttgart, where he was one of the three judges of the Swabian alliance until the end of 1512. In the midst of his official duties and his private practise, he found time to publish at Pforzheim, in 1506, his De rudimentis Hebraicis. This was followed in 1512 by a Hebrew edition of the seven penitential Psalms with a literal Latin translation and grammatical explanation for the use of beginners; and in 1515 by his De accentibus et orthographia lingum Hebraic�. In the mean time he had published in 1517 his De arte cabbalistica, in which the cabala was held to have been revealed to Adam by an angel and to have been preserved in unbroken tradition to the time of the great synagogue and then transmitted by it to the writers of the Talmud. The cabala was further asserted to be in harmony with the Pythagorean philosophy, which had drawn from Egyptian, Jewish, and Persian sources. The esoteric doctrines of the cabala were emphasized and the various methods of gematria were explained and exemplified.
During this period Reuchlin became involved in the controversy which was to embitter the closing years of his life. As early as 1505, in his missive, Warumb die Juden so lang im elend sind, he had held that the wretchedness of the Jews was a punishment for their rejection of the Messiah and their stubborn unbelief. At the same time, he did not wish them persecuted, but prayed that God might enlighten them. But Johann Pfefferkorn, a converted Jew, acted differently. He sought to compel the Jews to surrender all books contrary to the Christianfaith and to attend sermons preached for their conversion. Pfefferkorn's course won the approval of the emperor, who, on Aug. 19, 1509, issued a mandate requiring compliance with his plans. Reuchlin declined to cooperate with Pfefferkorn, while Uriel, archbishop of Mainz, forbade Pfefferkorn to work in his archdiocese until further notice. Meanwhile the Jews of Frankfort had complained to the emperor that Pfefferkorn was ignorant in these matters, and Maximilian placed Uriel in charge of the confiscation, at the same time directing him to assemble certain scholars and others; including Reuchlin, and then to decide the matter. But Uriel delayed, and on July 6, 1510, Pfefferkorn obtained from the emperor a new requirement that the archbishop should merely secure the written opinions of those he "had before been directed to consult, these decisions being intended for the emperor's consideration. On Oct. 6, 1510, Reuchlin accordingly delivered his opinion. He distinguished between obvious impieties, such as the Nizahon and the Toledoth Yeshu, which should be destroyed after legal investigation 500
and condemnation, and the others, which should be preserved. The latter were divided into six categories, characterized partly as having no bearing on Christianity (as philosophy and natural science), partly as unobjectionable (liturgies), partly as indispensable for understanding the Bible (commentaries), partly as defending the Christian faith (the cabala), and partly as containing much of value along with superstition (the Talmud). He likewise held that the Jews were not heretics, but could claim legal protection. The opinions of the other scholars were radically different, and Maximilian determined to lay the matter before the diet, but no actual steps were ever taken.
The literary controversy, however, still dragged on, and Pfefferkorn finally offered to be judged by the emperor, the archbishop of Mainz, a university, or the inquisitor. Reuchlin replied to Pfefferkorn in his Augenspiegel (1511), but the pastor at Frankfort Peter Meyer, judging the book heterodox, inhibited it and sent a copy to the Dominican Jakob Hochstraten, inquisitor of the province of Mainz, who submitted it to the theological faculty of Cologne. Arnold of Tungern and the Dominican Konrad K�llin, commissioned to examine it, required Reuchlin to withdraw all copies and publicly to beg his readers to consider him - a true Catholic and an enemy of the Jews and especially of the Talmud. This was demanding too much, and after a series of further polemics, including Reuchlin's Ain clare Verstentnus (1512) and Defensio contra calumniatores (1513), the emperor was prevailed upon to silence both parties in June, 1513. Reuchlin now endeavored, through Frederick the Wise, to have the mandate extended to all his opponents; and the attempt of a Dominican to malign Reuchlin to the elector led both Luther and Carlstadt to express themselves in his favor. Frederick answered the Dominican with diplomatic reserve; but meanwhile the Cologne faction had secured from the emperor the confiscation of the Defensio, while Hochstraten had gained the condemnation of the Augenspiegel from the universities of Louvain, Cologne, Mainz, Erfurt, and Paris. Reuchlin was accordingly cited before the court of the inquisition at Mainz (Sept. 9, 1513). He failed to appear, but appealed to the pope, and then went to Mainz in the hope of a peaceable understanding. Failing in this, he again appealed to the pope, who entrusted the decision to the Palagrave George, bishop of Speyer (Nov., 1513). George cited the parties concerned and delegated judgment to the learned canon Thomas Truchsess, a pupil of Reuchlin's. On Mar. 29, 1514, judgment was rendered in favor of Reuchlin, whereupon Hochstraten appealed to the pope, and a committee of twenty-two was finally appointed, which, on July 2, 1516, decided in Reuchlin's favor. At this moment, however, a papal mandatum de supersedendo was issued, and judgment was postponed indefinitely, though Hochstraten remained for a year in Rome, vainly endeavoring to secure the condemnation of the Augenapiegel.
Reuchlin had the sympathy of the Humanists, as was evidenced both by their letters addressed to him, which he published as Clarorum virorum epistol� (T�bingen, 1514, and Zurich, 1558) and Epistol� obscurorum virorum (q.v.). He had a powerful protector in Franz von Sickingen (see SICKINGEN, FRANZ VON), who warned the Dominicans, and especially Hochstraten, to leave Reuchlin in peace. A final court was now determined upon, which met at Frankfort in May, 1520, and, condemning Hochstraten's attitude, recommended that the provincial should prevail on the pope to end the controversy and enjoin silence on both parties, while the Dominican chapter deposed Hochstraten from his offices of prior and inquisitor. At Rome, however, Reuchlin was now considered to be in sympathy with Luther, and on June 23, 1520, the papal decision was rendered in favor of Hochstraten. Reuchlin appealed in vain to Rome, and Sickingen with equal futility to the emperor. But interest in the controversy was at an end-the problem of Luther had appeared.
On Feb. 29, 1520, Reuchlin was appointed by Duke William of Bavaria professor of Greek and Hebrew at Ingolstadt, but early in the following year the plague compelled him to go to T�bingen, where he lectured in 1521-22.
The indirect services of Reuchlin to the Reformation were considerable. In 1518 he recommended his great-nephew Melanchthon as professor
The death of Eberhard (Feb. 24, 1496) brought Reuchlin in peril of his life from the unbridled Eberhard the Younger and the Augustinian Konrad Holzinger, who were opposed to him. He fled from Stuttgart to Heidelberg and was appointed counselor and chief tutor by the Elector Palatine Philip, Dec. 31, 1497. In 1498 Reuchlin again went to Rome on a mission for his patron, finding opportunity to continue his Hebrew studies with a learned Jew, Obadiah Sforno, and meeting Aldus Manucius at Venice. In Apr., 1499, he was again at home. During the period of his residence at Heidelberg, which was now to end, he had written, besides Latin poems and epigrams, two Latin comedies in imitation of Terence, Sergius, and Henno.
Meanwhile Eberhard the Younger had been deposed in W�rttemberg, and it became possible for Reuchlin to return to Stuttgart, where he was one of the three judges of the Swabian alliance until the end of 1512. In the midst of his official duties and his private practise, he found time to publish at Pforzheim, in 1506, his De rudimentis Hebraicis. This was followed in 1512 by a Hebrew edition of the seven penitential Psalms with a literal Latin translation and grammatical explanation for the use of beginners; and in 1515 by his De accentibus et orthographia lingum Hebraic�. In the mean time he had published in 1517 his De arte cabbalistica, in which the cabala was held to have been revealed to Adam by an angel and to have been preserved in unbroken tradition to the time of the great synagogue and then transmitted by it to the writers of the Talmud. The cabala was further asserted to be in harmony with the Pythagorean philosophy, which had drawn from Egyptian, Jewish, and Persian sources. The esoteric doctrines of the cabala were emphasized and the various methods of gematria were explained and exemplified.
During this period Reuchlin became involved in the controversy which was to embitter the closing years of his life. As early as 1505, in his missive, Warumb die Juden so lang im elend sind, he had held that the wretchedness of the Jews was a punishment for their rejection of the Messiah and their stubborn unbelief. At the same time, he did not wish them persecuted, but prayed that God might enlighten them. But Johann Pfefferkorn, a converted Jew, acted differently. He sought to compel the Jews to surrender all books contrary to the Christianfaith and to attend sermons preached for their conversion. Pfefferkorn's course won the approval of the emperor, who, on Aug. 19, 1509, issued a mandate requiring compliance with his plans. Reuchlin declined to cooperate with Pfefferkorn, while Uriel, archbishop of Mainz, forbade Pfefferkorn to work in his archdiocese until further notice. Meanwhile the Jews of Frankfort had complained to the emperor that Pfefferkorn was ignorant in these matters, and Maximilian placed Uriel in charge of the confiscation, at the same time directing him to assemble certain scholars and others; including Reuchlin, and then to decide the matter. But Uriel delayed, and on July 6, 1510, Pfefferkorn obtained from the emperor a new requirement that the archbishop should merely secure the written opinions of those he "had before been directed to consult, these decisions being intended for the emperor's consideration. On Oct. 6, 1510, Reuchlin accordingly delivered his opinion. He distinguished between obvious impieties, such as the Nizahon and the Toledoth Yeshu, which should be destroyed after legal investigation 500
and condemnation, and the others, which should be preserved. The latter were divided into six categories, characterized partly as having no bearing on Christianity (as philosophy and natural science), partly as unobjectionable (liturgies), partly as indispensable for understanding the Bible (commentaries), partly as defending the Christian faith (the cabala), and partly as containing much of value along with superstition (the Talmud). He likewise held that the Jews were not heretics, but could claim legal protection. The opinions of the other scholars were radically different, and Maximilian determined to lay the matter before the diet, but no actual steps were ever taken.
The literary controversy, however, still dragged on, and Pfefferkorn finally offered to be judged by the emperor, the archbishop of Mainz, a university, or the inquisitor. Reuchlin replied to Pfefferkorn in his Augenspiegel (1511), but the pastor at Frankfort Peter Meyer, judging the book heterodox, inhibited it and sent a copy to the Dominican Jakob Hochstraten, inquisitor of the province of Mainz, who submitted it to the theological faculty of Cologne. Arnold of Tungern and the Dominican Konrad K�llin, commissioned to examine it, required Reuchlin to withdraw all copies and publicly to beg his readers to consider him - a true Catholic and an enemy of the Jews and especially of the Talmud. This was demanding too much, and after a series of further polemics, including Reuchlin's Ain clare Verstentnus (1512) and Defensio contra calumniatores (1513), the emperor was prevailed upon to silence both parties in June, 1513. Reuchlin now endeavored, through Frederick the Wise, to have the mandate extended to all his opponents; and the attempt of a Dominican to malign Reuchlin to the elector led both Luther and Carlstadt to express themselves in his favor. Frederick answered the Dominican with diplomatic reserve; but meanwhile the Cologne faction had secured from the emperor the confiscation of the Defensio, while Hochstraten had gained the condemnation of the Augenspiegel from the universities of Louvain, Cologne, Mainz, Erfurt, and Paris. Reuchlin was accordingly cited before the court of the inquisition at Mainz (Sept. 9, 1513). He failed to appear, but appealed to the pope, and then went to Mainz in the hope of a peaceable understanding. Failing in this, he again appealed to the pope, who entrusted the decision to the Palagrave George, bishop of Speyer (Nov., 1513). George cited the parties concerned and delegated judgment to the learned canon Thomas Truchsess, a pupil of Reuchlin's. On Mar. 29, 1514, judgment was rendered in favor of Reuchlin, whereupon Hochstraten appealed to the pope, and a committee of twenty-two was finally appointed, which, on July 2, 1516, decided in Reuchlin's favor. At this moment, however, a papal mandatum de supersedendo was issued, and judgment was postponed indefinitely, though Hochstraten remained for a year in Rome, vainly endeavoring to secure the condemnation of the Augenapiegel.
Reuchlin had the sympathy of the Humanists, as was evidenced both by their letters addressed to him, which he published as Clarorum virorum epistol� (T�bingen, 1514, and Zurich, 1558) and Epistol� obscurorum virorum (q.v.). He had a powerful protector in Franz von Sickingen (see SICKINGEN, FRANZ VON), who warned the Dominicans, and especially Hochstraten, to leave Reuchlin in peace. A final court was now determined upon, which met at Frankfort in May, 1520, and, condemning Hochstraten's attitude, recommended that the provincial should prevail on the pope to end the controversy and enjoin silence on both parties, while the Dominican chapter deposed Hochstraten from his offices of prior and inquisitor. At Rome, however, Reuchlin was now considered to be in sympathy with Luther, and on June 23, 1520, the papal decision was rendered in favor of Hochstraten. Reuchlin appealed in vain to Rome, and Sickingen with equal futility to the emperor. But interest in the controversy was at an end-the problem of Luther had appeared.
On Feb. 29, 1520, Reuchlin was appointed by Duke William of Bavaria professor of Greek and Hebrew at Ingolstadt, but early in the following year the plague compelled him to go to T�bingen, where he lectured in 1521-22.
The indirect services of Reuchlin to the Reformation were considerable. In 1518 he recommended his great-nephew Melanchthon as professor
Friday, March 16, 2007
Speaking Of Luther And The Jews...
Here's one view:
If I recall, that is more or less what Dad (of "Dad's Blog" fame) has told me before? Perhaps that is the official Missouri Synod position? In our politically correct day and age, though, one can't help but admit that some of Luther's language sure sounds a bit harsh to these modern ears. If you're interested in the exact language, I'm afraid I'll just have to let you seek that out yourself...
UPDATE: Should've known a simple bit of googling would do the deed. The LCMS position:
I have to admit, I generally do believe there is some validity to needing to understand things in historical context; so, not being entirely versed in the subject, I'm not exactly sure how I feel about a simple, outright condemnation of Luther's "regrettable" words. Certainly, in our modern context, with our modern understandings, the "regrettable" words are something that absolutely could not be defended if said today - but I'm not 100% convinced there isn't some kernel of validity to the above-quoted explanation of the historical context.
I guess what I'm trying to get at is that a simple "condemnation" of the words, without adequate understanding of the historical context, in some way seems to imply that Luther would hold similarly "regrettable" views if he were around today, and I'm not sure that's true. Or, at least, he would probably explain his views differently.
[Cross-posted at the IOP.]
Luther initially preached tolerance towards the Jewish people, convinced that the reason they had never converted to Christianity was that they were discriminated against, or had never heard the Gospel of Christ. However, after his overtures to Jews failed to convince Jewish people to adopt Christianity, he began preaching that the Jews were set in evil, anti-Christian ways, and needed to be expelled from German politics. In his On the Jews and Their Lies, he repeatedly quotes the words of Jesus in Matthew 12:34, where Jesus called them "a brood of vipers and children of the devil"
Luther was zealous toward the Gospel, and he wanted to protect the people of his homeland from the Jews who he believed would be harmful influences since they did not recognize Jesus as their Saviour. In Luther's time, parents had a right and a duty to direct their children's marriage choices in respect to matters of faith. Likewise, Luther felt a duty to direct his German people to cling to the Jesus the Jews did not accept. It should be noted that church law was superior to civil law in Luther's day and that law said the penalty of blasphemy was death. When Luther called for the deaths of certain Jews, he was merely asking that the laws that were applied to all other Germans also be applied to the Jews. The Jews were exempt from the church laws that Christians were bound by, most notably the law against charging interest.
If I recall, that is more or less what Dad (of "Dad's Blog" fame) has told me before? Perhaps that is the official Missouri Synod position? In our politically correct day and age, though, one can't help but admit that some of Luther's language sure sounds a bit harsh to these modern ears. If you're interested in the exact language, I'm afraid I'll just have to let you seek that out yourself...
UPDATE: Should've known a simple bit of googling would do the deed. The LCMS position:
While The Lutheran Church--Missouri Synod holds Martin Luther in high esteem for his bold proclamation and clear articulation of the teachings of Scripture, it deeply regrets and deplores statements made by Luther which express a negative and hostile attitude toward the Jews. In light of the many positive and caring statements concerning the Jews made by Luther throughout his lifetime, it would not be fair on the basis of these few regrettable (and uncharacteristic) negative statements, to characterize the reformer as "a rabid anti-Semite." The LCMS, however, does not seek to "excuse" these statements of Luther, but denounces them (without denouncing Luther's theology). In 1983, the Synod adopted an official resolution addressing these statements of Luther and making clear its own position on anti-Semitism. The text of this resolution reads as follows...
I have to admit, I generally do believe there is some validity to needing to understand things in historical context; so, not being entirely versed in the subject, I'm not exactly sure how I feel about a simple, outright condemnation of Luther's "regrettable" words. Certainly, in our modern context, with our modern understandings, the "regrettable" words are something that absolutely could not be defended if said today - but I'm not 100% convinced there isn't some kernel of validity to the above-quoted explanation of the historical context.
I guess what I'm trying to get at is that a simple "condemnation" of the words, without adequate understanding of the historical context, in some way seems to imply that Luther would hold similarly "regrettable" views if he were around today, and I'm not sure that's true. Or, at least, he would probably explain his views differently.
[Cross-posted at the IOP.]
Thursday, March 15, 2007
#2069-T0 the City-Council of Regensburg
Grace and peace in Christ. Honorable, perceptive, dear Lords! It might be though strange that I should undertake writing to E.F. (Your Honors?)However, so many good people have pleaded earnestly that I could not let it go and thought it would be helpful and favorable for me to do.
E.F. see and experience daily (as we also, unfortunately)how the evil foe everywhere arouse sects, Anabaptists, or (as Christ says) false prophets and false doctrine and leads many a country and people in tribulation and need (may God protect from city from that). I can and also will not plead that E.F. should accept our doctrine and way. However, I do plead that E.F. would take a serious look so that sectarian-spirits do not take root in your city. It requires sincere concern, very sincere once again because the devil is angry poisonous without measure so that no precaution is too much. He has in two or three years afflicted cities with divisive-spirits whom I am sure also are prsent in your city. E.F. earnest desire to obtain a preacher so that the Gospel or the Holy Scripture is taught in quietness and peace is not a mistake and God grant grace thereto. Our Confession at Augsburg is good for that and so pure that our enemies had to praise it and the imperial majesty left it uncondemned at the Council which is sign that it is right. However, I am writing to you that E.F. can promote the Gospel, our teaching and confession, amongst you well without mentioning the Lutheran name but rather from the text of Scripture proclaimed to the people so that they learn that it is the doctrine of Christ Himself and his apostles and exalted under the same Name (without any names of men) as it can also be found in the Gospel and Epistles of St. Paul. However, I cannot do more than pray that the Father of all grace and mercy would give you the Spirit of His grace earnestly to consider the Word of His truth and help you also thereto. I am moved to such prayer by such a dangerous time ( as said above) and the great wrath of the devil regarding which we have been all too secure and several already have slumbered. God help them to correct this, Amen. Herewith, be commended to God that He will grant you a blessed and peaceful regime and preserve it, Amen. On the Tuesday after Peter and Paul (30 June) 1534. E.F.'s willing Martinus Luther,D.
NOTE: June 30 is also the anniversary of the presentation of the Evangelical Confession presented in nearby Augusburg before the Emperor in 1530.
E.F. see and experience daily (as we also, unfortunately)how the evil foe everywhere arouse sects, Anabaptists, or (as Christ says) false prophets and false doctrine and leads many a country and people in tribulation and need (may God protect from city from that). I can and also will not plead that E.F. should accept our doctrine and way. However, I do plead that E.F. would take a serious look so that sectarian-spirits do not take root in your city. It requires sincere concern, very sincere once again because the devil is angry poisonous without measure so that no precaution is too much. He has in two or three years afflicted cities with divisive-spirits whom I am sure also are prsent in your city. E.F. earnest desire to obtain a preacher so that the Gospel or the Holy Scripture is taught in quietness and peace is not a mistake and God grant grace thereto. Our Confession at Augsburg is good for that and so pure that our enemies had to praise it and the imperial majesty left it uncondemned at the Council which is sign that it is right. However, I am writing to you that E.F. can promote the Gospel, our teaching and confession, amongst you well without mentioning the Lutheran name but rather from the text of Scripture proclaimed to the people so that they learn that it is the doctrine of Christ Himself and his apostles and exalted under the same Name (without any names of men) as it can also be found in the Gospel and Epistles of St. Paul. However, I cannot do more than pray that the Father of all grace and mercy would give you the Spirit of His grace earnestly to consider the Word of His truth and help you also thereto. I am moved to such prayer by such a dangerous time ( as said above) and the great wrath of the devil regarding which we have been all too secure and several already have slumbered. God help them to correct this, Amen. Herewith, be commended to God that He will grant you a blessed and peaceful regime and preserve it, Amen. On the Tuesday after Peter and Paul (30 June) 1534. E.F.'s willing Martinus Luther,D.
NOTE: June 30 is also the anniversary of the presentation of the Evangelical Confession presented in nearby Augusburg before the Emperor in 1530.
Benedict XVI at U of Regensburg, Sept.2006
APOSTOLIC JOURNEY OF HIS HOLINESS BENEDICT XVI
TO MÜNCHEN, ALTÖTTING AND REGENSBURG
(SEPTEMBER 9-14, 2006)
MEETING WITH THE REPRESENTATIVES OF SCIENCE
LECTURE OF THE HOLY FATHER
Aula Magna of the University of Regensburg
Tuesday, 12 September 2006
Faith, Reason and the University
Memories and Reflections
Your Eminences, Your Magnificences, Your Excellencies,
Distinguished Ladies and Gentlemen,
It is a moving experience for me to be back again in the university and to be able once again to give a lecture at this podium. I think back to those years when, after a pleasant period at the Freisinger Hochschule, I began teaching at the University of Bonn. That was in 1959, in the days of the old university made up of ordinary professors. The various chairs had neither assistants nor secretaries, but in recompense there was much direct contact with students and in particular among the professors themselves. We would meet before and after lessons in the rooms of the teaching staff. There was a lively exchange with historians, philosophers, philologists and, naturally, between the two theological faculties. Once a semester there was a dies academicus, when professors from every faculty appeared before the students of the entire university, making possible a genuine experience of universitas - something that you too, Magnificent Rector, just mentioned - the experience, in other words, of the fact that despite our specializations which at times make it difficult to communicate with each other, we made up a whole, working in everything on the basis of a single rationality with its various aspects and sharing responsibility for the right use of reason - this reality became a lived experience. The university was also very proud of its two theological faculties. It was clear that, by inquiring about the reasonableness of faith, they too carried out a work which is necessarily part of the "whole" of the universitas scientiarum, even if not everyone could share the faith which theologians seek to correlate with reason as a whole. This profound sense of coherence within the universe of reason was not troubled, even when it was once reported that a colleague had said there was something odd about our university: it had two faculties devoted to something that did not exist: God. That even in the face of such radical scepticism it is still necessary and reasonable to raise the question of God through the use of reason, and to do so in the context of the tradition of the Christian faith: this, within the university as a whole, was accepted without question.
I was reminded of all this recently, when I read the edition by Professor Theodore Khoury (Münster) of part of the dialogue carried on - perhaps in 1391 in the winter barracks near Ankara - by the erudite Byzantine emperor Manuel II Paleologus and an educated Persian on the subject of Christianity and Islam, and the truth of both.[1] It was presumably the emperor himself who set down this dialogue, during the siege of Constantinople between 1394 and 1402; and this would explain why his arguments are given in greater detail than those of his Persian interlocutor.[2] The dialogue ranges widely over the structures of faith contained in the Bible and in the Qur'an, and deals especially with the image of God and of man, while necessarily returning repeatedly to the relationship between - as they were called - three "Laws" or "rules of life": the Old Testament, the New Testament and the Qur'an. It is not my intention to discuss this question in the present lecture; here I would like to discuss only one point - itself rather marginal to the dialogue as a whole - which, in the context of the issue of "faith and reason", I found interesting and which can serve as the starting-point for my reflections on this issue.
In the seventh conversation (διάλεξις - controversy) edited by Professor Khoury, the emperor touches on the theme of the holy war. The emperor must have known that surah 2, 256 reads: "There is no compulsion in religion". According to some of the experts, this is probably one of the suras of the early period, when Mohammed was still powerless and under threat. But naturally the emperor also knew the instructions, developed later and recorded in the Qur'an, concerning holy war. Without descending to details, such as the difference in treatment accorded to those who have the "Book" and the "infidels", he addresses his interlocutor with a startling brusqueness, a brusqueness that we find unacceptable, on the central question about the relationship between religion and violence in general, saying: "Show me just what Mohammed brought that was new, and there you will find things only evil and inhuman, such as his command to spread by the sword the faith he preached.”[3] The emperor, after having expressed himself so forcefully, goes on to explain in detail the reasons why spreading the faith through violence is something unreasonable. Violence is incompatible with the nature of God and the nature of the soul. "God", he says, "is not pleased by blood - and not acting reasonably (σὺν λόγω) is contrary to God's nature. Faith is born of the soul, not the body. Whoever would lead someone to faith needs the ability to speak well and to reason properly, without violence and threats... To convince a reasonable soul, one does not need a strong arm, or weapons of any kind, or any other means of threatening a person with death...".[4]
The decisive statement in this argument against violent conversion is this: not to act in accordance with reason is contrary to God's nature.[5] The editor, Theodore Khoury, observes: For the emperor, as a Byzantine shaped by Greek philosophy, this statement is self-evident. But for Muslim teaching, God is absolutely transcendent. His will is not bound up with any of our categories, even that of rationality.[6] Here Khoury quotes a work of the noted French Islamist R. Arnaldez, who points out that Ibn Hazm went so far as to state that God is not bound even by his own word, and that nothing would oblige him to reveal the truth to us. Were it God's will, we would even have to practise idolatry.[7]
At this point, as far as understanding of God and thus the concrete practice of religion is concerned, we are faced with an unavoidable dilemma. Is the conviction that acting unreasonably contradicts God's nature merely a Greek idea, or is it always and intrinsically true? I believe that here we can see the profound harmony between what is Greek in the best sense of the word and the biblical understanding of faith in God. Modifying the first verse of the Book of Genesis, the first verse of the whole Bible, John began the prologue of his Gospel with the words: "In the beginning was the λόγος". This is the very word used by the emperor: God acts, σὺν λόγω, with logos. Logos means both reason and word - a reason which is creative and capable of self-communication, precisely as reason. John thus spoke the final word on the biblical concept of God, and in this word all the often toilsome and tortuous threads of biblical faith find their culmination and synthesis. In the beginning was the logos, and the logos is God, says the Evangelist. The encounter between the Biblical message and Greek thought did not happen by chance. The vision of Saint Paul, who saw the roads to Asia barred and in a dream saw a Macedonian man plead with him: "Come over to Macedonia and help us!" (cf. Acts 16:6-10) - this vision can be interpreted as a "distillation" of the intrinsic necessity of a rapprochement between Biblical faith and Greek inquiry.
In point of fact, this rapprochement had been going on for some time. The mysterious name of God, revealed from the burning bush, a name which separates this God from all other divinities with their many names and simply asserts being, "I am", already presents a challenge to the notion of myth, to which Socrates' attempt to vanquish and transcend myth stands in close analogy.[8] Within the Old Testament, the process which started at the burning bush came to new maturity at the time of the Exile, when the God of Israel, an Israel now deprived of its land and worship, was proclaimed as the God of heaven and earth and described in a simple formula which echoes the words uttered at the burning bush: "I am". This new understanding of God is accompanied by a kind of enlightenment, which finds stark expression in the mockery of gods who are merely the work of human hands (cf. Ps 115). Thus, despite the bitter conflict with those Hellenistic rulers who sought to accommodate it forcibly to the customs and idolatrous cult of the Greeks, biblical faith, in the Hellenistic period, encountered the best of Greek thought at a deep level, resulting in a mutual enrichment evident especially in the later wisdom literature. Today we know that the Greek translation of the Old Testament produced at Alexandria - the Septuagint - is more than a simple (and in that sense really less than satisfactory) translation of the Hebrew text: it is an independent textual witness and a distinct and important step in the history of revelation, one which brought about this encounter in a way that was decisive for the birth and spread of Christianity.[9] A profound encounter of faith and reason is taking place here, an encounter between genuine enlightenment and religion. From the very heart of Christian faith and, at the same time, the heart of Greek thought now joined to faith, Manuel II was able to say: Not to act "with logos" is contrary to God's nature.
In all honesty, one must observe that in the late Middle Ages we find trends in theology which would sunder this synthesis between the Greek spirit and the Christian spirit. In contrast with the so-called intellectualism of Augustine and Thomas, there arose with Duns Scotus a voluntarism which, in its later developments, led to the claim that we can only know God's voluntas ordinata. Beyond this is the realm of God's freedom, in virtue of which he could have done the opposite of everything he has actually done. This gives rise to positions which clearly approach those of Ibn Hazm and might even lead to the image of a capricious God, who is not even bound to truth and goodness. God's transcendence and otherness are so exalted that our reason, our sense of the true and good, are no longer an authentic mirror of God, whose deepest possibilities remain eternally unattainable and hidden behind his actual decisions. As opposed to this, the faith of the Church has always insisted that between God and us, between his eternal Creator Spirit and our created reason there exists a real analogy, in which - as the Fourth Lateran Council in 1215 stated - unlikeness remains infinitely greater than likeness, yet not to the point of abolishing analogy and its language. God does not become more divine when we push him away from us in a sheer, impenetrable voluntarism; rather, the truly divine God is the God who has revealed himself as logos and, as logos, has acted and continues to act lovingly on our behalf. Certainly, love, as Saint Paul says, "transcends" knowledge and is thereby capable of perceiving more than thought alone (cf. Eph 3:19); nonetheless it continues to be love of the God who is Logos. Consequently, Christian worship is, again to quote Paul - "λογικη λατρεία", worship in harmony with the eternal Word and with our reason (cf. Rom 12:1).[10]
This inner rapprochement between Biblical faith and Greek philosophical inquiry was an event of decisive importance not only from the standpoint of the history of religions, but also from that of world history - it is an event which concerns us even today. Given this convergence, it is not surprising that Christianity, despite its origins and some significant developments in the East, finally took on its historically decisive character in Europe. We can also express this the other way around: this convergence, with the subsequent addition of the Roman heritage, created Europe and remains the foundation of what can rightly be called Europe.
The thesis that the critically purified Greek heritage forms an integral part of Christian faith has been countered by the call for a dehellenization of Christianity - a call which has more and more dominated theological discussions since the beginning of the modern age. Viewed more closely, three stages can be observed in the programme of dehellenization: although interconnected, they are clearly distinct from one another in their motivations and objectives.[11]
Dehellenization first emerges in connection with the postulates of the Reformation in the sixteenth century. Looking at the tradition of scholastic theology, the Reformers thought they were confronted with a faith system totally conditioned by philosophy, that is to say an articulation of the faith based on an alien system of thought. As a result, faith no longer appeared as a living historical Word but as one element of an overarching philosophical system. The principle of sola scriptura, on the other hand, sought faith in its pure, primordial form, as originally found in the biblical Word. Metaphysics appeared as a premise derived from another source, from which faith had to be liberated in order to become once more fully itself. When Kant stated that he needed to set thinking aside in order to make room for faith, he carried this programme forward with a radicalism that the Reformers could never have foreseen. He thus anchored faith exclusively in practical reason, denying it access to reality as a whole.
The liberal theology of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries ushered in a second stage in the process of dehellenization, with Adolf von Harnack as its outstanding representative. When I was a student, and in the early years of my teaching, this programme was highly influential in Catholic theology too. It took as its point of departure Pascal's distinction between the God of the philosophers and the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob. In my inaugural lecture at Bonn in 1959, I tried to address the issue,[12] and I do not intend to repeat here what I said on that occasion, but I would like to describe at least briefly what was new about this second stage of dehellenization. Harnack's central idea was to return simply to the man Jesus and to his simple message, underneath the accretions of theology and indeed of hellenization: this simple message was seen as the culmination of the religious development of humanity. Jesus was said to have put an end to worship in favour of morality. In the end he was presented as the father of a humanitarian moral message. Fundamentally, Harnack's goal was to bring Christianity back into harmony with modern reason, liberating it, that is to say, from seemingly philosophical and theological elements, such as faith in Christ's divinity and the triune God. In this sense, historical-critical exegesis of the New Testament, as he saw it, restored to theology its place within the university: theology, for Harnack, is something essentially historical and therefore strictly scientific. What it is able to say critically about Jesus is, so to speak, an expression of practical reason and consequently it can take its rightful place within the university. Behind this thinking lies the modern self-limitation of reason, classically expressed in Kant's "Critiques", but in the meantime further radicalized by the impact of the natural sciences. This modern concept of reason is based, to put it briefly, on a synthesis between Platonism (Cartesianism) and empiricism, a synthesis confirmed by the success of technology. On the one hand it presupposes the mathematical structure of matter, its intrinsic rationality, which makes it possible to understand how matter works and use it efficiently: this basic premise is, so to speak, the Platonic element in the modern understanding of nature. On the other hand, there is nature's capacity to be exploited for our purposes, and here only the possibility of verification or falsification through experimentation can yield decisive certainty. The weight between the two poles can, depending on the circumstances, shift from one side to the other. As strongly positivistic a thinker as J. Monod has declared himself a convinced Platonist/Cartesian.
This gives rise to two principles which are crucial for the issue we have raised. First, only the kind of certainty resulting from the interplay of mathematical and empirical elements can be considered scientific. Anything that would claim to be science must be measured against this criterion. Hence the human sciences, such as history, psychology, sociology and philosophy, attempt to conform themselves to this canon of scientificity. A second point, which is important for our reflections, is that by its very nature this method excludes the question of God, making it appear an unscientific or pre-scientific question. Consequently, we are faced with a reduction of the radius of science and reason, one which needs to be questioned.
I will return to this problem later. In the meantime, it must be observed that from this standpoint any attempt to maintain theology's claim to be "scientific" would end up reducing Christianity to a mere fragment of its former self. But we must say more: if science as a whole is this and this alone, then it is man himself who ends up being reduced, for the specifically human questions about our origin and destiny, the questions raised by religion and ethics, then have no place within the purview of collective reason as defined by "science", so understood, and must thus be relegated to the realm of the subjective. The subject then decides, on the basis of his experiences, what he considers tenable in matters of religion, and the subjective "conscience" becomes the sole arbiter of what is ethical. In this way, though, ethics and religion lose their power to create a community and become a completely personal matter. This is a dangerous state of affairs for humanity, as we see from the disturbing pathologies of religion and reason which necessarily erupt when reason is so reduced that questions of religion and ethics no longer concern it. Attempts to construct an ethic from the rules of evolution or from psychology and sociology, end up being simply inadequate.
Before I draw the conclusions to which all this has been leading, I must briefly refer to the third stage of dehellenization, which is now in progress. In the light of our experience with cultural pluralism, it is often said nowadays that the synthesis with Hellenism achieved in the early Church was an initial inculturation which ought not to be binding on other cultures. The latter are said to have the right to return to the simple message of the New Testament prior to that inculturation, in order to inculturate it anew in their own particular milieux. This thesis is not simply false, but it is coarse and lacking in precision. The New Testament was written in Greek and bears the imprint of the Greek spirit, which had already come to maturity as the Old Testament developed. True, there are elements in the evolution of the early Church which do not have to be integrated into all cultures. Nonetheless, the fundamental decisions made about the relationship between faith and the use of human reason are part of the faith itself; they are developments consonant with the nature of faith itself.
And so I come to my conclusion. This attempt, painted with broad strokes, at a critique of modern reason from within has nothing to do with putting the clock back to the time before the Enlightenment and rejecting the insights of the modern age. The positive aspects of modernity are to be acknowledged unreservedly: we are all grateful for the marvellous possibilities that it has opened up for mankind and for the progress in humanity that has been granted to us. The scientific ethos, moreover, is - as you yourself mentioned, Magnificent Rector - the will to be obedient to the truth, and, as such, it embodies an attitude which belongs to the essential decisions of the Christian spirit. The intention here is not one of retrenchment or negative criticism, but of broadening our concept of reason and its application. While we rejoice in the new possibilities open to humanity, we also see the dangers arising from these possibilities and we must ask ourselves how we can overcome them. We will succeed in doing so only if reason and faith come together in a new way, if we overcome the self-imposed limitation of reason to the empirically falsifiable, and if we once more disclose its vast horizons. In this sense theology rightly belongs in the university and within the wide-ranging dialogue of sciences, not merely as a historical discipline and one of the human sciences, but precisely as theology, as inquiry into the rationality of faith.
Only thus do we become capable of that genuine dialogue of cultures and religions so urgently needed today. In the Western world it is widely held that only positivistic reason and the forms of philosophy based on it are universally valid. Yet the world's profoundly religious cultures see this exclusion of the divine from the universality of reason as an attack on their most profound convictions. A reason which is deaf to the divine and which relegates religion into the realm of subcultures is incapable of entering into the dialogue of cultures. At the same time, as I have attempted to show, modern scientific reason with its intrinsically Platonic element bears within itself a question which points beyond itself and beyond the possibilities of its methodology. Modern scientific reason quite simply has to accept the rational structure of matter and the correspondence between our spirit and the prevailing rational structures of nature as a given, on which its methodology has to be based. Yet the question why this has to be so is a real question, and one which has to be remanded by the natural sciences to other modes and planes of thought - to philosophy and theology. For philosophy and, albeit in a different way, for theology, listening to the great experiences and insights of the religious traditions of humanity, and those of the Christian faith in particular, is a source of knowledge, and to ignore it would be an unacceptable restriction of our listening and responding. Here I am reminded of something Socrates said to Phaedo. In their earlier conversations, many false philosophical opinions had been raised, and so Socrates says: "It would be easily understandable if someone became so annoyed at all these false notions that for the rest of his life he despised and mocked all talk about being - but in this way he would be deprived of the truth of existence and would suffer a great loss".[13] The West has long been endangered by this aversion to the questions which underlie its rationality, and can only suffer great harm thereby. The courage to engage the whole breadth of reason, and not the denial of its grandeur - this is the programme with which a theology grounded in Biblical faith enters into the debates of our time. "Not to act reasonably, not to act with logos, is contrary to the nature of God", said Manuel II, according to his Christian understanding of God, in response to his Persian interlocutor. It is to this great logos, to this breadth of reason, that we invite our partners in the dialogue of cultures. To rediscover it constantly is the great task of the university.
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[1] Of the total number of 26 conversations (διάλεξις – Khoury translates this as “controversy”) in the dialogue (“Entretien”), T. Khoury published the 7th “controversy” with footnotes and an extensive introduction on the origin of the text, on the manuscript tradition and on the structure of the dialogue, together with brief summaries of the “controversies” not included in the edition; the Greek text is accompanied by a French translation: “Manuel II Paléologue, Entretiens avec un Musulman. 7e Controverse”, Sources Chrétiennes n. 115, Paris 1966. In the meantime, Karl Förstel published in Corpus Islamico-Christianum (Series Graeca ed. A. T. Khoury and R. Glei) an edition of the text in Greek and German with commentary: “Manuel II. Palaiologus, Dialoge mit einem Muslim”, 3 vols., Würzburg-Altenberge 1993-1996. As early as 1966, E. Trapp had published the Greek text with an introduction as vol. II of Wiener byzantinische Studien. I shall be quoting from Khoury’s edition.
[2] On the origin and redaction of the dialogue, cf. Khoury, pp. 22-29; extensive comments in this regard can also be found in the editions of Förstel and Trapp.
[3] Controversy VII, 2 c: Khoury, pp. 142-143; Förstel, vol. I, VII. Dialog 1.5, pp. 240-241. In the Muslim world, this quotation has unfortunately been taken as an expression of my personal position, thus arousing understandable indignation. I hope that the reader of my text can see immediately that this sentence does not express my personal view of the Qur’an, for which I have the respect due to the holy book of a great religion. In quoting the text of the Emperor Manuel II, I intended solely to draw out the essential relationship between faith and reason. On this point I am in agreement with Manuel II, but without endorsing his polemic.
[4] Controversy VII, 3 b–c: Khoury, pp. 144-145; Förstel vol. I, VII. Dialog 1.6, pp. 240-243.
[5] It was purely for the sake of this statement that I quoted the dialogue between Manuel and his Persian interlocutor. In this statement the theme of my subsequent reflections emerges.
[6] Cf. Khoury, p. 144, n. 1.
[7] R. Arnaldez, Grammaire et théologie chez Ibn Hazm de Cordoue, Paris 1956, p. 13; cf. Khoury, p. 144. The fact that comparable positions exist in the theology of the late Middle Ages will appear later in my discourse.
[8] Regarding the widely discussed interpretation of the episode of the burning bush, I refer to my book Introduction to Christianity, London 1969, pp. 77-93 (originally published in German as Einführung in das Christentum, Munich 1968; N.B. the pages quoted refer to the entire chapter entitled “The Biblical Belief in God”). I think that my statements in that book, despite later developments in the discussion, remain valid today.
[9] Cf. A. Schenker, “L’Écriture sainte subsiste en plusieurs formes canoniques simultanées”, in L’Interpretazione della Bibbia nella Chiesa. Atti del Simposio promosso dalla Congregazione per la Dottrina della Fede, Vatican City 2001, pp. 178-186.
[10] On this matter I expressed myself in greater detail in my book The Spirit of the Liturgy, San Francisco 2000, pp. 44-50.
[11] Of the vast literature on the theme of dehellenization, I would like to mention above all: A. Grillmeier, “Hellenisierung-Judaisierung des Christentums als Deuteprinzipien der Geschichte des kirchlichen Dogmas”, in idem, Mit ihm und in ihm. Christologische Forschungen und Perspektiven, Freiburg 1975, pp. 423-488.
[12] Newly published with commentary by Heino Sonnemans (ed.): Joseph Ratzinger-Benedikt XVI, Der Gott des Glaubens und der Gott der Philosophen. Ein Beitrag zum Problem der theologia naturalis, Johannes-Verlag Leutesdorf, 2nd revised edition, 2005.
[13] Cf. 90 c-d. For this text, cf. also R. Guardini, Der Tod des Sokrates, 5th edition, Mainz-Paderborn 1987, pp. 218-221.
© Copyright 2006 - Libreria Editrice Vaticana
TO MÜNCHEN, ALTÖTTING AND REGENSBURG
(SEPTEMBER 9-14, 2006)
MEETING WITH THE REPRESENTATIVES OF SCIENCE
LECTURE OF THE HOLY FATHER
Aula Magna of the University of Regensburg
Tuesday, 12 September 2006
Faith, Reason and the University
Memories and Reflections
Your Eminences, Your Magnificences, Your Excellencies,
Distinguished Ladies and Gentlemen,
It is a moving experience for me to be back again in the university and to be able once again to give a lecture at this podium. I think back to those years when, after a pleasant period at the Freisinger Hochschule, I began teaching at the University of Bonn. That was in 1959, in the days of the old university made up of ordinary professors. The various chairs had neither assistants nor secretaries, but in recompense there was much direct contact with students and in particular among the professors themselves. We would meet before and after lessons in the rooms of the teaching staff. There was a lively exchange with historians, philosophers, philologists and, naturally, between the two theological faculties. Once a semester there was a dies academicus, when professors from every faculty appeared before the students of the entire university, making possible a genuine experience of universitas - something that you too, Magnificent Rector, just mentioned - the experience, in other words, of the fact that despite our specializations which at times make it difficult to communicate with each other, we made up a whole, working in everything on the basis of a single rationality with its various aspects and sharing responsibility for the right use of reason - this reality became a lived experience. The university was also very proud of its two theological faculties. It was clear that, by inquiring about the reasonableness of faith, they too carried out a work which is necessarily part of the "whole" of the universitas scientiarum, even if not everyone could share the faith which theologians seek to correlate with reason as a whole. This profound sense of coherence within the universe of reason was not troubled, even when it was once reported that a colleague had said there was something odd about our university: it had two faculties devoted to something that did not exist: God. That even in the face of such radical scepticism it is still necessary and reasonable to raise the question of God through the use of reason, and to do so in the context of the tradition of the Christian faith: this, within the university as a whole, was accepted without question.
I was reminded of all this recently, when I read the edition by Professor Theodore Khoury (Münster) of part of the dialogue carried on - perhaps in 1391 in the winter barracks near Ankara - by the erudite Byzantine emperor Manuel II Paleologus and an educated Persian on the subject of Christianity and Islam, and the truth of both.[1] It was presumably the emperor himself who set down this dialogue, during the siege of Constantinople between 1394 and 1402; and this would explain why his arguments are given in greater detail than those of his Persian interlocutor.[2] The dialogue ranges widely over the structures of faith contained in the Bible and in the Qur'an, and deals especially with the image of God and of man, while necessarily returning repeatedly to the relationship between - as they were called - three "Laws" or "rules of life": the Old Testament, the New Testament and the Qur'an. It is not my intention to discuss this question in the present lecture; here I would like to discuss only one point - itself rather marginal to the dialogue as a whole - which, in the context of the issue of "faith and reason", I found interesting and which can serve as the starting-point for my reflections on this issue.
In the seventh conversation (διάλεξις - controversy) edited by Professor Khoury, the emperor touches on the theme of the holy war. The emperor must have known that surah 2, 256 reads: "There is no compulsion in religion". According to some of the experts, this is probably one of the suras of the early period, when Mohammed was still powerless and under threat. But naturally the emperor also knew the instructions, developed later and recorded in the Qur'an, concerning holy war. Without descending to details, such as the difference in treatment accorded to those who have the "Book" and the "infidels", he addresses his interlocutor with a startling brusqueness, a brusqueness that we find unacceptable, on the central question about the relationship between religion and violence in general, saying: "Show me just what Mohammed brought that was new, and there you will find things only evil and inhuman, such as his command to spread by the sword the faith he preached.”[3] The emperor, after having expressed himself so forcefully, goes on to explain in detail the reasons why spreading the faith through violence is something unreasonable. Violence is incompatible with the nature of God and the nature of the soul. "God", he says, "is not pleased by blood - and not acting reasonably (σὺν λόγω) is contrary to God's nature. Faith is born of the soul, not the body. Whoever would lead someone to faith needs the ability to speak well and to reason properly, without violence and threats... To convince a reasonable soul, one does not need a strong arm, or weapons of any kind, or any other means of threatening a person with death...".[4]
The decisive statement in this argument against violent conversion is this: not to act in accordance with reason is contrary to God's nature.[5] The editor, Theodore Khoury, observes: For the emperor, as a Byzantine shaped by Greek philosophy, this statement is self-evident. But for Muslim teaching, God is absolutely transcendent. His will is not bound up with any of our categories, even that of rationality.[6] Here Khoury quotes a work of the noted French Islamist R. Arnaldez, who points out that Ibn Hazm went so far as to state that God is not bound even by his own word, and that nothing would oblige him to reveal the truth to us. Were it God's will, we would even have to practise idolatry.[7]
At this point, as far as understanding of God and thus the concrete practice of religion is concerned, we are faced with an unavoidable dilemma. Is the conviction that acting unreasonably contradicts God's nature merely a Greek idea, or is it always and intrinsically true? I believe that here we can see the profound harmony between what is Greek in the best sense of the word and the biblical understanding of faith in God. Modifying the first verse of the Book of Genesis, the first verse of the whole Bible, John began the prologue of his Gospel with the words: "In the beginning was the λόγος". This is the very word used by the emperor: God acts, σὺν λόγω, with logos. Logos means both reason and word - a reason which is creative and capable of self-communication, precisely as reason. John thus spoke the final word on the biblical concept of God, and in this word all the often toilsome and tortuous threads of biblical faith find their culmination and synthesis. In the beginning was the logos, and the logos is God, says the Evangelist. The encounter between the Biblical message and Greek thought did not happen by chance. The vision of Saint Paul, who saw the roads to Asia barred and in a dream saw a Macedonian man plead with him: "Come over to Macedonia and help us!" (cf. Acts 16:6-10) - this vision can be interpreted as a "distillation" of the intrinsic necessity of a rapprochement between Biblical faith and Greek inquiry.
In point of fact, this rapprochement had been going on for some time. The mysterious name of God, revealed from the burning bush, a name which separates this God from all other divinities with their many names and simply asserts being, "I am", already presents a challenge to the notion of myth, to which Socrates' attempt to vanquish and transcend myth stands in close analogy.[8] Within the Old Testament, the process which started at the burning bush came to new maturity at the time of the Exile, when the God of Israel, an Israel now deprived of its land and worship, was proclaimed as the God of heaven and earth and described in a simple formula which echoes the words uttered at the burning bush: "I am". This new understanding of God is accompanied by a kind of enlightenment, which finds stark expression in the mockery of gods who are merely the work of human hands (cf. Ps 115). Thus, despite the bitter conflict with those Hellenistic rulers who sought to accommodate it forcibly to the customs and idolatrous cult of the Greeks, biblical faith, in the Hellenistic period, encountered the best of Greek thought at a deep level, resulting in a mutual enrichment evident especially in the later wisdom literature. Today we know that the Greek translation of the Old Testament produced at Alexandria - the Septuagint - is more than a simple (and in that sense really less than satisfactory) translation of the Hebrew text: it is an independent textual witness and a distinct and important step in the history of revelation, one which brought about this encounter in a way that was decisive for the birth and spread of Christianity.[9] A profound encounter of faith and reason is taking place here, an encounter between genuine enlightenment and religion. From the very heart of Christian faith and, at the same time, the heart of Greek thought now joined to faith, Manuel II was able to say: Not to act "with logos" is contrary to God's nature.
In all honesty, one must observe that in the late Middle Ages we find trends in theology which would sunder this synthesis between the Greek spirit and the Christian spirit. In contrast with the so-called intellectualism of Augustine and Thomas, there arose with Duns Scotus a voluntarism which, in its later developments, led to the claim that we can only know God's voluntas ordinata. Beyond this is the realm of God's freedom, in virtue of which he could have done the opposite of everything he has actually done. This gives rise to positions which clearly approach those of Ibn Hazm and might even lead to the image of a capricious God, who is not even bound to truth and goodness. God's transcendence and otherness are so exalted that our reason, our sense of the true and good, are no longer an authentic mirror of God, whose deepest possibilities remain eternally unattainable and hidden behind his actual decisions. As opposed to this, the faith of the Church has always insisted that between God and us, between his eternal Creator Spirit and our created reason there exists a real analogy, in which - as the Fourth Lateran Council in 1215 stated - unlikeness remains infinitely greater than likeness, yet not to the point of abolishing analogy and its language. God does not become more divine when we push him away from us in a sheer, impenetrable voluntarism; rather, the truly divine God is the God who has revealed himself as logos and, as logos, has acted and continues to act lovingly on our behalf. Certainly, love, as Saint Paul says, "transcends" knowledge and is thereby capable of perceiving more than thought alone (cf. Eph 3:19); nonetheless it continues to be love of the God who is Logos. Consequently, Christian worship is, again to quote Paul - "λογικη λατρεία", worship in harmony with the eternal Word and with our reason (cf. Rom 12:1).[10]
This inner rapprochement between Biblical faith and Greek philosophical inquiry was an event of decisive importance not only from the standpoint of the history of religions, but also from that of world history - it is an event which concerns us even today. Given this convergence, it is not surprising that Christianity, despite its origins and some significant developments in the East, finally took on its historically decisive character in Europe. We can also express this the other way around: this convergence, with the subsequent addition of the Roman heritage, created Europe and remains the foundation of what can rightly be called Europe.
The thesis that the critically purified Greek heritage forms an integral part of Christian faith has been countered by the call for a dehellenization of Christianity - a call which has more and more dominated theological discussions since the beginning of the modern age. Viewed more closely, three stages can be observed in the programme of dehellenization: although interconnected, they are clearly distinct from one another in their motivations and objectives.[11]
Dehellenization first emerges in connection with the postulates of the Reformation in the sixteenth century. Looking at the tradition of scholastic theology, the Reformers thought they were confronted with a faith system totally conditioned by philosophy, that is to say an articulation of the faith based on an alien system of thought. As a result, faith no longer appeared as a living historical Word but as one element of an overarching philosophical system. The principle of sola scriptura, on the other hand, sought faith in its pure, primordial form, as originally found in the biblical Word. Metaphysics appeared as a premise derived from another source, from which faith had to be liberated in order to become once more fully itself. When Kant stated that he needed to set thinking aside in order to make room for faith, he carried this programme forward with a radicalism that the Reformers could never have foreseen. He thus anchored faith exclusively in practical reason, denying it access to reality as a whole.
The liberal theology of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries ushered in a second stage in the process of dehellenization, with Adolf von Harnack as its outstanding representative. When I was a student, and in the early years of my teaching, this programme was highly influential in Catholic theology too. It took as its point of departure Pascal's distinction between the God of the philosophers and the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob. In my inaugural lecture at Bonn in 1959, I tried to address the issue,[12] and I do not intend to repeat here what I said on that occasion, but I would like to describe at least briefly what was new about this second stage of dehellenization. Harnack's central idea was to return simply to the man Jesus and to his simple message, underneath the accretions of theology and indeed of hellenization: this simple message was seen as the culmination of the religious development of humanity. Jesus was said to have put an end to worship in favour of morality. In the end he was presented as the father of a humanitarian moral message. Fundamentally, Harnack's goal was to bring Christianity back into harmony with modern reason, liberating it, that is to say, from seemingly philosophical and theological elements, such as faith in Christ's divinity and the triune God. In this sense, historical-critical exegesis of the New Testament, as he saw it, restored to theology its place within the university: theology, for Harnack, is something essentially historical and therefore strictly scientific. What it is able to say critically about Jesus is, so to speak, an expression of practical reason and consequently it can take its rightful place within the university. Behind this thinking lies the modern self-limitation of reason, classically expressed in Kant's "Critiques", but in the meantime further radicalized by the impact of the natural sciences. This modern concept of reason is based, to put it briefly, on a synthesis between Platonism (Cartesianism) and empiricism, a synthesis confirmed by the success of technology. On the one hand it presupposes the mathematical structure of matter, its intrinsic rationality, which makes it possible to understand how matter works and use it efficiently: this basic premise is, so to speak, the Platonic element in the modern understanding of nature. On the other hand, there is nature's capacity to be exploited for our purposes, and here only the possibility of verification or falsification through experimentation can yield decisive certainty. The weight between the two poles can, depending on the circumstances, shift from one side to the other. As strongly positivistic a thinker as J. Monod has declared himself a convinced Platonist/Cartesian.
This gives rise to two principles which are crucial for the issue we have raised. First, only the kind of certainty resulting from the interplay of mathematical and empirical elements can be considered scientific. Anything that would claim to be science must be measured against this criterion. Hence the human sciences, such as history, psychology, sociology and philosophy, attempt to conform themselves to this canon of scientificity. A second point, which is important for our reflections, is that by its very nature this method excludes the question of God, making it appear an unscientific or pre-scientific question. Consequently, we are faced with a reduction of the radius of science and reason, one which needs to be questioned.
I will return to this problem later. In the meantime, it must be observed that from this standpoint any attempt to maintain theology's claim to be "scientific" would end up reducing Christianity to a mere fragment of its former self. But we must say more: if science as a whole is this and this alone, then it is man himself who ends up being reduced, for the specifically human questions about our origin and destiny, the questions raised by religion and ethics, then have no place within the purview of collective reason as defined by "science", so understood, and must thus be relegated to the realm of the subjective. The subject then decides, on the basis of his experiences, what he considers tenable in matters of religion, and the subjective "conscience" becomes the sole arbiter of what is ethical. In this way, though, ethics and religion lose their power to create a community and become a completely personal matter. This is a dangerous state of affairs for humanity, as we see from the disturbing pathologies of religion and reason which necessarily erupt when reason is so reduced that questions of religion and ethics no longer concern it. Attempts to construct an ethic from the rules of evolution or from psychology and sociology, end up being simply inadequate.
Before I draw the conclusions to which all this has been leading, I must briefly refer to the third stage of dehellenization, which is now in progress. In the light of our experience with cultural pluralism, it is often said nowadays that the synthesis with Hellenism achieved in the early Church was an initial inculturation which ought not to be binding on other cultures. The latter are said to have the right to return to the simple message of the New Testament prior to that inculturation, in order to inculturate it anew in their own particular milieux. This thesis is not simply false, but it is coarse and lacking in precision. The New Testament was written in Greek and bears the imprint of the Greek spirit, which had already come to maturity as the Old Testament developed. True, there are elements in the evolution of the early Church which do not have to be integrated into all cultures. Nonetheless, the fundamental decisions made about the relationship between faith and the use of human reason are part of the faith itself; they are developments consonant with the nature of faith itself.
And so I come to my conclusion. This attempt, painted with broad strokes, at a critique of modern reason from within has nothing to do with putting the clock back to the time before the Enlightenment and rejecting the insights of the modern age. The positive aspects of modernity are to be acknowledged unreservedly: we are all grateful for the marvellous possibilities that it has opened up for mankind and for the progress in humanity that has been granted to us. The scientific ethos, moreover, is - as you yourself mentioned, Magnificent Rector - the will to be obedient to the truth, and, as such, it embodies an attitude which belongs to the essential decisions of the Christian spirit. The intention here is not one of retrenchment or negative criticism, but of broadening our concept of reason and its application. While we rejoice in the new possibilities open to humanity, we also see the dangers arising from these possibilities and we must ask ourselves how we can overcome them. We will succeed in doing so only if reason and faith come together in a new way, if we overcome the self-imposed limitation of reason to the empirically falsifiable, and if we once more disclose its vast horizons. In this sense theology rightly belongs in the university and within the wide-ranging dialogue of sciences, not merely as a historical discipline and one of the human sciences, but precisely as theology, as inquiry into the rationality of faith.
Only thus do we become capable of that genuine dialogue of cultures and religions so urgently needed today. In the Western world it is widely held that only positivistic reason and the forms of philosophy based on it are universally valid. Yet the world's profoundly religious cultures see this exclusion of the divine from the universality of reason as an attack on their most profound convictions. A reason which is deaf to the divine and which relegates religion into the realm of subcultures is incapable of entering into the dialogue of cultures. At the same time, as I have attempted to show, modern scientific reason with its intrinsically Platonic element bears within itself a question which points beyond itself and beyond the possibilities of its methodology. Modern scientific reason quite simply has to accept the rational structure of matter and the correspondence between our spirit and the prevailing rational structures of nature as a given, on which its methodology has to be based. Yet the question why this has to be so is a real question, and one which has to be remanded by the natural sciences to other modes and planes of thought - to philosophy and theology. For philosophy and, albeit in a different way, for theology, listening to the great experiences and insights of the religious traditions of humanity, and those of the Christian faith in particular, is a source of knowledge, and to ignore it would be an unacceptable restriction of our listening and responding. Here I am reminded of something Socrates said to Phaedo. In their earlier conversations, many false philosophical opinions had been raised, and so Socrates says: "It would be easily understandable if someone became so annoyed at all these false notions that for the rest of his life he despised and mocked all talk about being - but in this way he would be deprived of the truth of existence and would suffer a great loss".[13] The West has long been endangered by this aversion to the questions which underlie its rationality, and can only suffer great harm thereby. The courage to engage the whole breadth of reason, and not the denial of its grandeur - this is the programme with which a theology grounded in Biblical faith enters into the debates of our time. "Not to act reasonably, not to act with logos, is contrary to the nature of God", said Manuel II, according to his Christian understanding of God, in response to his Persian interlocutor. It is to this great logos, to this breadth of reason, that we invite our partners in the dialogue of cultures. To rediscover it constantly is the great task of the university.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[1] Of the total number of 26 conversations (διάλεξις – Khoury translates this as “controversy”) in the dialogue (“Entretien”), T. Khoury published the 7th “controversy” with footnotes and an extensive introduction on the origin of the text, on the manuscript tradition and on the structure of the dialogue, together with brief summaries of the “controversies” not included in the edition; the Greek text is accompanied by a French translation: “Manuel II Paléologue, Entretiens avec un Musulman. 7e Controverse”, Sources Chrétiennes n. 115, Paris 1966. In the meantime, Karl Förstel published in Corpus Islamico-Christianum (Series Graeca ed. A. T. Khoury and R. Glei) an edition of the text in Greek and German with commentary: “Manuel II. Palaiologus, Dialoge mit einem Muslim”, 3 vols., Würzburg-Altenberge 1993-1996. As early as 1966, E. Trapp had published the Greek text with an introduction as vol. II of Wiener byzantinische Studien. I shall be quoting from Khoury’s edition.
[2] On the origin and redaction of the dialogue, cf. Khoury, pp. 22-29; extensive comments in this regard can also be found in the editions of Förstel and Trapp.
[3] Controversy VII, 2 c: Khoury, pp. 142-143; Förstel, vol. I, VII. Dialog 1.5, pp. 240-241. In the Muslim world, this quotation has unfortunately been taken as an expression of my personal position, thus arousing understandable indignation. I hope that the reader of my text can see immediately that this sentence does not express my personal view of the Qur’an, for which I have the respect due to the holy book of a great religion. In quoting the text of the Emperor Manuel II, I intended solely to draw out the essential relationship between faith and reason. On this point I am in agreement with Manuel II, but without endorsing his polemic.
[4] Controversy VII, 3 b–c: Khoury, pp. 144-145; Förstel vol. I, VII. Dialog 1.6, pp. 240-243.
[5] It was purely for the sake of this statement that I quoted the dialogue between Manuel and his Persian interlocutor. In this statement the theme of my subsequent reflections emerges.
[6] Cf. Khoury, p. 144, n. 1.
[7] R. Arnaldez, Grammaire et théologie chez Ibn Hazm de Cordoue, Paris 1956, p. 13; cf. Khoury, p. 144. The fact that comparable positions exist in the theology of the late Middle Ages will appear later in my discourse.
[8] Regarding the widely discussed interpretation of the episode of the burning bush, I refer to my book Introduction to Christianity, London 1969, pp. 77-93 (originally published in German as Einführung in das Christentum, Munich 1968; N.B. the pages quoted refer to the entire chapter entitled “The Biblical Belief in God”). I think that my statements in that book, despite later developments in the discussion, remain valid today.
[9] Cf. A. Schenker, “L’Écriture sainte subsiste en plusieurs formes canoniques simultanées”, in L’Interpretazione della Bibbia nella Chiesa. Atti del Simposio promosso dalla Congregazione per la Dottrina della Fede, Vatican City 2001, pp. 178-186.
[10] On this matter I expressed myself in greater detail in my book The Spirit of the Liturgy, San Francisco 2000, pp. 44-50.
[11] Of the vast literature on the theme of dehellenization, I would like to mention above all: A. Grillmeier, “Hellenisierung-Judaisierung des Christentums als Deuteprinzipien der Geschichte des kirchlichen Dogmas”, in idem, Mit ihm und in ihm. Christologische Forschungen und Perspektiven, Freiburg 1975, pp. 423-488.
[12] Newly published with commentary by Heino Sonnemans (ed.): Joseph Ratzinger-Benedikt XVI, Der Gott des Glaubens und der Gott der Philosophen. Ein Beitrag zum Problem der theologia naturalis, Johannes-Verlag Leutesdorf, 2nd revised edition, 2005.
[13] Cf. 90 c-d. For this text, cf. also R. Guardini, Der Tod des Sokrates, 5th edition, Mainz-Paderborn 1987, pp. 218-221.
© Copyright 2006 - Libreria Editrice Vaticana
Wednesday, March 14, 2007
#2067-To Nicholas von Amsdorf
Grace and peace in Christ! Better Amsdorf, I also have not seen the answer of Erasmus; they have concealed this matter from me with great zeal; perhaps they fear I will respond in heat. D. Jonas, Pommer, and Philip have read it. A single copy of it, they say, is now in Dessau. Jonas says that the same is in the letter as in the book, which in fact he has sent, a copy of whihc I have seen and you also have seen as you have written. I have expected something great things him whom I have so challenged. I have not concluded what I shall do until I have seen his answer. Yet there is one piece of advice which you have on hand namely that we despise such people as Wicel, Haner, Cochlaeus,in relation to Erasmus their head and guarantor and turn the weapons on them in that just as Eck promoted the Pope by defending him so these people promote Erasmus by praising him. This writer has brought this about by his ambiguity and nothing chatter. The attack must be mounted against him for it is just as if a butterfly has laid a horde of larvae in the garden of the church; "it is" as the Saxons say ,"Schietrupe". Therfore it would please me if you would publicly publish your comments against him (as you write). Then it is better that the sciences fail than religion when the sciences do not serve but trample Christ under their feet. If we permit this we would be guilty of trampling Christ and He will (if we don't want to) awaken others who will be bold since Christ will rule. Several want through wisdom to bring Christ and Belial in unanimity: "that will amount to nothing". Be it well with you in Christ and pray for me. On the Sunday after John (28 June) 1534. Your Martin Luther.
nOTE: ML talks to Amsdorf about Erasmus in letter #2037 which is in another volume (Vol.XVIII). I guess you can figure out the vulgar "Schietrupe" but don't print it in English on my blog. The mention of Dr. Eck might have reminded him of the appelation "DRECK".
nOTE: ML talks to Amsdorf about Erasmus in letter #2037 which is in another volume (Vol.XVIII). I guess you can figure out the vulgar "Schietrupe" but don't print it in English on my blog. The mention of Dr. Eck might have reminded him of the appelation "DRECK".
Tuesday, March 13, 2007
Pommerschen und gekeln
So back to your letter. According to the WWW on line "Pommerschen"--remember "chen" is always a friendly diminutive--refers to the wife of the Prince von Anhalt, Margarethe, daughter of the Kurfürst Joachim I, von Brandenburg, and widow of Duke Georg von Pommern.
"Hamester" next to the diminutive "Pommerschen" is probably also a diminutive. According to what follows in Bugenhagen's letter, he probably means Margarethe's daughter from her first marriage, Georgia who was born in 1537.
M. Franciscus refers to Burkhard. My version of the letter has slightly different wording about the pawns:
vnd die [19] bauren zu gebeln.11And the note reads:
Anmerkung11) So ist zu lesen, nicht, wie die Drucke haben, gekeln, was D. Wb. 4. Bd. 1. Abt. 1. Hälfte Sp. 1559 gedeutet ist = gaukeln transitiv. Alfred Götze hat mir wieder liebenswürdigst ausgeholfen: “gabeln (bei Luther mit Umlaut gäbeln) beim Schachspiel ist: in die Gabel ziehen, einen Platz einnehmen, von dem eine Figur zwei andere bedroht. Das Zeitwort kann ich nicht belegen, für Gabel bietet Lessing, Nathan II 1 (Lachmann 2, 226) den klassischen Beleg: Sittah: Der Springer wird unbedeckt. Saladin: Ist wahr. Nun so! Sittah: So zieh' ich in die Gabel. Wer gar versteht, mit einem an sich wertlosen Bauern zwei Figuren zu bedrohen, muß ein guter Schachspieler sein.”
///////Thanks to Agnes of Luther Index for the above. Correction:Georgia was born in 1531. you got to be good to threaten two pieces with a pawn.
"Hamester" next to the diminutive "Pommerschen" is probably also a diminutive. According to what follows in Bugenhagen's letter, he probably means Margarethe's daughter from her first marriage, Georgia who was born in 1537.
M. Franciscus refers to Burkhard. My version of the letter has slightly different wording about the pawns:
vnd die [19] bauren zu gebeln.11And the note reads:
Anmerkung11) So ist zu lesen, nicht, wie die Drucke haben, gekeln, was D. Wb. 4. Bd. 1. Abt. 1. Hälfte Sp. 1559 gedeutet ist = gaukeln transitiv. Alfred Götze hat mir wieder liebenswürdigst ausgeholfen: “gabeln (bei Luther mit Umlaut gäbeln) beim Schachspiel ist: in die Gabel ziehen, einen Platz einnehmen, von dem eine Figur zwei andere bedroht. Das Zeitwort kann ich nicht belegen, für Gabel bietet Lessing, Nathan II 1 (Lachmann 2, 226) den klassischen Beleg: Sittah: Der Springer wird unbedeckt. Saladin: Ist wahr. Nun so! Sittah: So zieh' ich in die Gabel. Wer gar versteht, mit einem an sich wertlosen Bauern zwei Figuren zu bedrohen, muß ein guter Schachspieler sein.”
///////Thanks to Agnes of Luther Index for the above. Correction:Georgia was born in 1531. you got to be good to threaten two pieces with a pawn.
Saturday, March 10, 2007
#2062-To Joachim, Prince in Anhalt
To the illustrious, high-born Prince and Lord, Herr Joachim, Prince in Anhalt,Graf in Ascanien and Lord in Bernburg, my gracious Lord.
G.u.F. (grace and peace) in Christ. Gracious Prince and Lord! Mr. Johann Beichling has brought me a very good message about E.F.G. liking to eat good things. Truly I have presently and previously at all times also said and prayed (as m.g.Herr, the Worthy-Probst): Ach, God, let my Prince be healthy and happy; I hope it will be done. After first I have given my lord printer something to eat so that he lets me rest I want to bring Pommer (Bugenhagen) with me to the Pomeranians and Hamester (?) so m.g. Frau may see how Pommer and the Pomeranians are honorably and happily looked upon. Herewith, be commended to God,Amen. And may E.F.G. be happy. My pater noster (Our Father) and I also are with E.F.G. Yet, I must express that E.F.G. take care with M.Franciscus in chess; he thinks he can play very well and I would give him a beautiful rose if can do as well as he thinks. He knows how to position the knight, move the Rook, and the Pawns to gekeln (?)but the Frau (queen?) is his master in the game, and to be sure, in much more. That he well understands, Amen. XII June 1534. E.F.G.'s willing Martinus Luther,D.
NOTES: Can't translate Hamester and gekeln. Perhaps the former has to do with the people around Hamburg where Bugenhagen served and Pommer means a Pomeranian. Perhaps 'gekel' the pawn means to castle??
G.u.F. (grace and peace) in Christ. Gracious Prince and Lord! Mr. Johann Beichling has brought me a very good message about E.F.G. liking to eat good things. Truly I have presently and previously at all times also said and prayed (as m.g.Herr, the Worthy-Probst): Ach, God, let my Prince be healthy and happy; I hope it will be done. After first I have given my lord printer something to eat so that he lets me rest I want to bring Pommer (Bugenhagen) with me to the Pomeranians and Hamester (?) so m.g. Frau may see how Pommer and the Pomeranians are honorably and happily looked upon. Herewith, be commended to God,Amen. And may E.F.G. be happy. My pater noster (Our Father) and I also are with E.F.G. Yet, I must express that E.F.G. take care with M.Franciscus in chess; he thinks he can play very well and I would give him a beautiful rose if can do as well as he thinks. He knows how to position the knight, move the Rook, and the Pawns to gekeln (?)but the Frau (queen?) is his master in the game, and to be sure, in much more. That he well understands, Amen. XII June 1534. E.F.G.'s willing Martinus Luther,D.
NOTES: Can't translate Hamester and gekeln. Perhaps the former has to do with the people around Hamburg where Bugenhagen served and Pommer means a Pomeranian. Perhaps 'gekel' the pawn means to castle??
Monday, March 05, 2007
#2061-To Friedrich Myconius in Gotha
To Herr Friedrich Myconius in Gotha.
Grace and peace! I seek, I plead, I implore you, my dear Friedrich, that this man, Valten Korner, be commended to you since he has pressed his case upon me, though, to be sure, is not well-known to me (as you can easily believe). If it is as he relates I would not have him subjected to force. Again since I know that there are men there who have proved themselves among you in faithfulness and virtue and you would not knowlingly subject anyone to injustice. For this reason, as I have previously pleaded, I continue to plead that if his case has not yet been heard that you help, as much as you can, that it be investigated. If the matter is now outside of your hands, and is in the hands of the authority (Centaurorum) to be dealt with so take care that I am notified I make an attempt with the Prince as far as I can. I cannot let the people go away sadly, and yet "it is a blind case", which has either been decided at your place or should be decided there. Be it well with you, my dear Myconius, and be in this matter one rich in peace (Friedrich) and peaceful (Friedsamus). The LOrd be with you,Amen. On the 10th of June 1534.
Would you send this accompanying letter to our Justus Menius by an opportune messenger. Your Martin Luther.
NOTE: Menius is the pastor in nearby Eisenach.
Grace and peace! I seek, I plead, I implore you, my dear Friedrich, that this man, Valten Korner, be commended to you since he has pressed his case upon me, though, to be sure, is not well-known to me (as you can easily believe). If it is as he relates I would not have him subjected to force. Again since I know that there are men there who have proved themselves among you in faithfulness and virtue and you would not knowlingly subject anyone to injustice. For this reason, as I have previously pleaded, I continue to plead that if his case has not yet been heard that you help, as much as you can, that it be investigated. If the matter is now outside of your hands, and is in the hands of the authority (Centaurorum) to be dealt with so take care that I am notified I make an attempt with the Prince as far as I can. I cannot let the people go away sadly, and yet "it is a blind case", which has either been decided at your place or should be decided there. Be it well with you, my dear Myconius, and be in this matter one rich in peace (Friedrich) and peaceful (Friedsamus). The LOrd be with you,Amen. On the 10th of June 1534.
Would you send this accompanying letter to our Justus Menius by an opportune messenger. Your Martin Luther.
NOTE: Menius is the pastor in nearby Eisenach.
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